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Hume’s Correlationism 
On Meillassoux, Necessity and Belief 
Paul O’Mahoney 
Marino Institute (Dublin) 
Es hat niemals eine Zeit gegeben, in der ich durch mich selbst von meinem 
Leben überzeugt war. Ich erfasse nämlich die Dinge um mich nur in so 
hinfälligen Vorstellungen, daß ich immer glaube, die Dinge hätten einmal 
gelebt, jetzt aber seien sie versinkend. Immer, lieber Herr, habe ich eine 
Lust, die Dinge so zu sehen, wie sie sich geben mögen, ehe sie sich mir 
zeigen. Sie sind da wohl schön und ruhig. Es muß so sein, denn ich höre 
oft Leute in dieser Weise von ihnen reden. 
—Kafka, “Gespräch mit dem Beter” 
One billiard ball strikes another, and the second is moved in a certain 
way by the impact. The movement conforms to the expectations of an 
observer, and is in accord with formulated laws of force and motion. The 
problem of induction states that: 
1) the observer had no guarantee prior to observation of 
the event that it would proceed in accord with his 
expectations; and 
2) the result of the impact on this occasion, even if in 
accord with similar events in the past, furnishes no 
guarantee that a similar impact will produce similar 
results if repeated.  
There is nothing to guarantee that the balls might not have or might not in 
the future jump up from the table, for example, or turn into a pair of mares; 
in short, that anything might happen. One must be careful to distinguish this 
statement from the statement simply that anything might happen. This 
latter, which we could formulate as, “It is not necessary that the balls should 
have conformed or in the future will conform to an observer’s expectations” 
cannot be made; it is not necessarily true. It might be false; the impact may 
indeed be governed by a necessity which is absolute, but it is a necessity 
which is inaccessible to human reason. To imagine other outcomes to that 
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observed entails no contradiction in reasoning, and so the necessity of the 
impact’s conformity to stable laws cannot be asserted; this ability to imagine 
other outcomes, however, does not itself warrant the assertion of non-
necessity, or of contingency. Asserting no guarantee of necessity in the 
matter for the observer does not give warrant to assert that there is no 
necessity simply. With Hume, one can always see that the problem of 
causality is already the problem of first principles, or of the final cause; final 
causes remain inaccessible to human reason, and in this resides, ultimately, 
the problem of induction. In the assertion of the obscurity of final cause, 
Hume was in agreement with Descartes (and Descartes in his turn with 
Bacon), but it is Hume who draws the most radical conclusion. This much 
was grasped readily by Nietzsche, not ordinarily the best reader of Hume.1 
The truth or falsity of a law is therefore finally unverifiable; Hume’s position 
points us toward truth and falsity becoming functions of human reason, in 
other words toward the correlationism with which Kant would oppose his 
skepticism, and toward modern forms of antirealism.        
Hume, of course, offered his own “skeptical solution” to the skeptical 
doubts concerning the operations of the understanding. He proceeds by 
enquiring as to the origin of or reason for our belief in relation to cause and 
effect, which is the basis of all of our reasoning and belief concerning 
matters of fact. He will ground it, as every reader of Hume knows well, in 
custom.2 Meillassoux’s summary of the move is perfectly adequate:  
Since we cannot demonstrate the necessity of the causal 
connection, [Hume] argues, we should stop asking 
ourselves why the laws are necessary and ask instead 
about the origin of our belief in their necessity. This 
amounts to a relocation of the problem that replaces a 
question about the nature of things with a question about 
our relation to things – one no longer asks why the laws 
are necessary, but why we are convinced that they are. 
Hume’s answer to this question can be summed up in a 
single word: habit, or custom. When a fact recurs, it 
engenders in us a spontaneous feeling of habituation 
which gives rise to the certainty that the same thing will 
re-occur in the future. It is this propensity to believe that 
what has already recurred will invariably recur in the 
same way in the future that governs our entire relation to 
nature.3  
Kant’s boldest statement of his so-called “scheme-content dualism” is 
perhaps that the categories prescribe laws to appearances, and therefore to 
nature itself as the totality of appearances.4 We may presume such a 
statement to indicate that laws, for example of motion and gravitation, may 
be manifestations of processes in nature—and hence not in any strong sense 
“invented” by man—but that they manifest themselves to us only within 
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space and time and in relation to phenomena, which are dependent on the 
categories. Hence, such laws insofar as they can be formulated can be 
formulated only in their relation to human perception; how and whether 
they act upon or pertain to things in themselves is outside the scope of 
human reason. It is not difficult to trace a line of philosophical descent from 
the “Copernican revolution,” which centered the subject and made him the 
imposer of forms on the world (even space and time, the “pure forms of 
intuition”), to the modern antirealist and anti-foundationalist elements 
associated with the twentieth-century “linguistic turn.” What must be 
remembered, and what ought to be clear enough from Meillassoux’s 
summary of Hume’s solution, is that whenever we encounter or hear 
repeated the Kantian chestnut from the Prolegomena about the recollection of 
Hume interrupting his dogmatic slumber, we must take account of two 
elements of Hume’s critique. If it (supplemented with reflection on the 
“antinomies of pure reason”) was the flint upon which Kant sparked his 
critical philosophy, this was not only because the radical denial of a priori 
knowledge spurred Kant to response, but also because Hume, in his 
“skeptical solution,” must have pointed the way to the Kantian response. 
Kant’s critical philosophy wished to salvage the a priori (and later, morality), 
and therewith a sure foundation for human knowledge. Hume, who we 
shall insist was also salvaging a form of necessity via belief, institutes what 
can only be called a form of correlationism.  
Meillassoux asserts that, just the same as those who provide 
“metaphysical” solutions, or Kant with his “transcendental” solution, 
“Hume too never really doubts causal necessity – he merely doubts our 
capacity to ground [it] through reasoning  . . . In all three cases, the question 
is never whether causal necessity actually exists or not but rather whether or 
not it is possible to furnish a reason for its necessity”5; and in this he is quite 
correct. The situation is for Meillassoux therefore a strange one, where 
philosophers ignore reason and favor the evidence supplied by habit and the 
senses:  
How could reason, for which the obvious falsity of causal 
necessity is blindingly evident, work against itself by 
demonstrating the truth of such a necessity? It is our 
senses that impose this belief in causality upon us, not 
thought. Thus, it would seem that a more judicious 
approach to the problem of the causal connection would 
begin on the basis of the evident falsity of this connection, 
rather than on the basis of its supposed truth. In any case, 
it is astonishing to note how in this matter, philosophers, 
who are generally the partisans of thought rather than of 
the senses, have opted overwhelmingly to trust their 
habitual perceptions, rather than the luminous clarity of 
intellection.6 
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It must first be pointed out here that what Hume is said to doubt is in fact 
what, as we pointed out in our opening paragraph, he can legitimately 
doubt. The error here is to speak, on the basis of the evident non-necessity of 
a guarantee for reason of the principle of causality or the uniformity of 
nature, of the “obvious falsity” of the principle, or of the laws of nature. 
Such a statement, as we have explained, is not sanctioned by the problem of 
induction (in fact, it is rather debarred than warranted by pointing out or 
accepting the inaccessibility of final causes to reason). There may well be a 
governing necessity; that such cannot be accessed in such a way as to serve 
as a guarantee to observing reason of the uniformity of nature cannot be taken 
to imply that no governing necessity is present, or that the principle of 
causality is false. Recall that the rejection of the ontological argument in 
Kant and Hume proceeds from the insistence that the apparent 
conceivability of an entity can never impose or guarantee its existence.7 
Neither could conceivable inexistence impose inexistence. Analogously, just 
as conceivability of the laws of nature cannot impose their truth, the mere 
conceivability of their being otherwise or unnecessary cannot produce, or 
deduce, or “impose” their falsity.  
What of the claim, then, that the skeptical solution is the most 
incoherent, and that Hume exhibits a blind faith in the evidence of his senses 
in maintaining (by not doubting) the necessity of causal connections?8 
Certainly Hume locates necessity in demonstrative rather than moral 
reasoning—reasoning which is not open to doubt because the negation or 
denial of its truths entails a contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction 
guarantees the truth of these “relations of ideas.” The claim that certainty or 
necessity pertains only to relations of ideas might seem to mark Hume as 
typical of the modern philosophical tradition, for which demonstrative truth 
is not only accessed by reason (rather than the senses) but is a property of 
reason’s own constructs.9 Hume, however, is different in crucial respects. 
Hume is emphatic in his assertion that all ideas are ultimately derivative 
from impressions; we know him as the most extreme of the empiricists. The 
ideas which are related in demonstrative reasoning derive from sense 
experience; though a perfect circle is not found anywhere in nature, yet it is 
not a mere construct of the mind or product of spontaneous reflection: rather 
it is suggested by its approximations in nature: derived, for example, from 
observation of a whirlpool, or the apparently perfectly spherical full moon.  
The emphasis of the claim that all knowledge is a posteriori means that 
for a Humean, even the principle of non-contradiction (considered 
epistemologically rather than ontologically), which is evidently necessary 
and an object of demonstrative rather than moral reasoning, must have its 
ultimate origin in impressions (even those ideas which are never directly 
experienced are formed ultimately either by analogy with prior experience 
or derived from extension of former ideas rooted in experience). Hence 
Meillassoux is imprecise when he writes: “As for the principle of non-
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contradiction, it allows us to establish a priori, and independently of any 
recourse to experience, that a contradictory event is impossible, that it 
cannot occur either today or tomorrow. But for Hume there is nothing 
contradictory in thinking that the same causes could produce different 
effects tomorrow.”10 The imprecision is in writing as if the a priori is original 
in Hume, as it is with Kant (a property of the categories), and not derived 
from experience. Even the principle of non-contradiction, as a principle, is 
not present in the mind prior to some experience of a contradiction, or the 
reasoning upon it, and recognition of the unthinkability of a contradiction. 
Similarly, it is potentially misleading, in discussing the “massive difference” 
between possibilities actually experienced in the empirical realm and those 
possibilities which are conceivable, to call the latter “the a priori or 
“imaginary” possibilities.”11 The content of the imagination in Hume is also 
derived from sense impressions—not, obviously, that one can imagine only 
what one has experienced directly, but the analogy or assembling of parts 
that goes into forming images is a faculty grounded in experience. Again, it 
somewhat misrepresents “the situation [of] Hume pondering his billiard 
balls” to say: “for each event given in experience, we can conceive a priori of 
a great many different empirical outcomes  . . . all of which appear to us to 
be equally possible.”12 Not that the imagination falters or encounters a 
contradiction if imagining any such outcome; the issue is that imagination of 
these outcomes is derivative from originary experience or sense-
impressions, and the imagination itself is not a priori in an originary way.13 
Meillassoux’s speculative position, he notes, must: 
  . . . finally take seriously what the Humean – not Kantian 
– a priori teaches us about the world, viz., that the same 
cause may actually bring about ‘a hundred different events’ 
(and even many more). What Hume tells us is that a priori, 
which is to say from a purely logical point of view, any 
cause may actually produce any effect whatsoever, 
provided the latter is not contradictory. There can be no 
doubt that this is the evident lesson of reason, which is to 
say, of the thinking whose only fealty is to the 
requirements of logical intelligibility – reason informs us 
of the possibility that our billiard-balls might frolic about 
in a thousand different ways (and many more) on the 
billiard table, without there being either a cause or a 
reason for this behaviour. For if reason knows of no a 
prioris other than that of non-contradiction, then it is 
perfectly compatible with reason for any consistent 
possibility to arise, without there being a discriminatory 
principle that would favour one possibility over another.14   
The relations that obtain between the ideas that are the objects of 
demonstrative reasoning are, ultimately, no less than the matter which is the 
P a u l  O ’ M a h o n e y  |  1 3 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.564 
object of the principles of association (resemblance, contiguity, causality) by 
which moral reasoning proceeds, derived from experience. As Meillassoux’s 
passage makes clear, there are Kantian and Humean a prioris; but of the 
latter, we might say that with Hume, the a priori is a posteriori. The truths of 
geometry do not spontaneously arise in the mind; they are derived, for 
example, from original reflection on approximations of geometrical shape in 
nature, or, as with most people, they are known through schooling. This is 
the important point: with Hume, reason dictates to us what is necessarily 
true, but reason is never considered wholly apart from the senses, which 
provide the originary experience on which reasonings of every kind are 
built. Hume’s is not that Cartesian reason which furnishes “clear and 
distinct” ideas through reason turning in upon itself.15 It follows that even in 
trusting reason, one is trusting what is partly built on the senses—and so to 
return to or implicitly trust in what is ‘imposed on us by the senses,’ that is, 
the belief in the uniformity of nature, is not as inconsistent or contradictory 
as Meillassoux considers it. With Hume—Meillassoux recognizes this—there 
is an element of reasoning in trusting in custom, though he considers it, 
following Vernes, a probabilistic reasoning, which he rejects.16 Because for 
Hume even that demonstrably true knowledge the denial of which would 
entail contradiction is built on originary experience, he does not consider the 
dictates of reason to be divorced from experience. For Hume to consider 
himself to be obeying dictates entirely divorced from experience would 
require him to be (and for us to consider him) a quite committed rationalist. 
So it is not unreasonable for Hume to consider that sense-experience would 
furnish a “discriminatory principle” or “principle of preference” in regard to 
matters of fact.17 With relations of ideas, the discriminatory principle is that 
of non-contradiction; with matters of fact, it is the considerably weaker one 
of habituation, but belief on the basis of custom is likewise a product of 
reasons and experience. To repeat in another way our earlier point, then: 
that reason can conceive of manifold possible outcomes in matters of fact 
does not mean that the contingency of the laws of nature is “the evident 
lesson of reason.” The fact that we can conceive of different possibilities 
equally in no way implies that the possibilities are necessarily equal. 
Obscurity of final necessity in the laws of nature does not imply their 
contingency, and the mere fact of non-contradiction in the imagination can 
hardly serve as the basis for positive knowledge. Nor can it preclude sense-
experience furnishing a principle of preference: it does so in demonstrative 
reasonings, through (knowledge of) the principle of non-contradiction.  
In what does Hume’s ‘correlationism” consist? Recall Meillassoux’s 
summary of Hume’s skeptical response as “a relocation of the problem that 
replaces a question about the nature of things with a question about our 
relation to things – one no longer asks why the laws are necessary, but why 
we are convinced that they are”; the feeling of certainty engendered by habit 
“governs our entire relation to nature” (my emphases). Hume has shifted focus 
from nature or the laws of nature to our relation to nature and how those 
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laws appear to us.18 By this move Hume is hoping to reinstate necessity in 
our relation to matters of fact. This is done by asserting the necessity of 
certain beliefs. In demonstrative reasoning, the negations of whose 
propositions would be contradictory, the reasoning is accompanied by a 
sentiment of belief; reason tells us these truths are necessary, and it is 
therefore necessary to believe them. Obviously Hume cannot hope for 
similar logical necessity in matters of fact. He can, however, divorce belief in 
these matters from the will. The sentiment of belief, though it is impossible 
to define, is nevertheless not governed by the will. Though we can join the 
head of a man to the body of a horse in the imagination, it is not in our power 
to believe such a creature exists. Equally, we can easily imagine the contrary 
of any matter of fact: but the sentiment of belief is lacking.19 In asserting the 
non-volitional nature of belief, Hume declares that as it is not in our power 
to believe certain things, so we are not at liberty to believe them: in short, it 
is necessary that we disbelieve them. This is not quite to say that we proceed 
by probabilistic reasoning, because there is very little reasoning involved; 
rather it is a sentiment to which we are led by custom; as for Bacon it is the 
“principal magistrate,” for Hume custom is “the great guide of human 
life.”20 While it is not forbidden by logic that two billiard balls colliding 
might “frolic about,” on the table, or be transformed into a pair of mating 
pandas, it is forbidden to our reason, or more properly to our sentiment, to 
believe such a thing possible. It is possible to imagine it, but it is not possible 
in any particular instance to believe it will happen: belief, not being 
volitional, can be necessary (where we are not at liberty to believe or 
disbelieve something, owing, say, to its fantastical or apparent nature). The 
important point is that a principle of preference is furnished: I may conceive 
of the possibility that any action may lead to any outcome; but I may also 
conceive of the possibility that there are stable laws of nature. For Hume, 
custom, based on experience—which is the ground also of demonstrative 
reasoning—is the guide which furnishes such a principle.  
It is by shifting from nature to our relation to nature that Hume, who 
was responsible for “the destruction of the principle of sufficient reason,”21 
salvages it in a modified and considerably weaker form. In lieu of the 
principle that for every fact or occurrence, there is a reason why it must be 
such and not otherwise, there must now be some reason for every belief 
concerning our relation to nature.22 Without such a reason, the possibility of 
a belief is disqualified. From this, one readily perceives how Meillassoux 
traces contemporary fideism to skeptical and critical philosophical critiques 
in the modern tradition; for Hume, it would equally be grounds for the 
illegitimacy of fideism, precisely because he separates belief from will: a 
willed belief, unaccompanied by the genuine, non-volitional sentiment that 
usually attends belief, is an illusion or a self-deception. Of course, all kinds 
of problems arise at this point: questions of repression, self-deception, 
ideological projection and distortion, cognitive dissonance, the grounds of 
religious conviction, of trust, and Foucauldian themes such as “regimes of 
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truth” and “power-knowledge.” Hume’s position cannot account for a false 
belief as distinct from a true one, if the sentiment of belief is present; one 
cannot arrive at certainty, only conviction, and this leads to metaphysical 
fideism and political “decisionism,” and ethical or pseudo-ethical stances 
that stress the formal commitment or “resoluteness” of one’s attitude rather 
than the content of one’s belief. Again, for Hume, however, reason tells us 
not that causal necessity is untrue, even if it is doubtable; custom and reason 
tell us to trust the evidence of our senses, and that our habitual 
understanding reflects stable laws of nature; custom (experience) and reason 
can lead us to certainty—as it does with demonstrative reasoning—and so, 
though the objects of demonstrative reasoning appear as absolute, while 
those of moral reasoning do not, our only guide in the matter is custom. It 
cannot tell us with certainty what can or cannot happen, but as regards 
belief, “sufficient reason” is required to produce the sentiment—to believe 
that a struck billiard ball will turn into a mare is impossible, and to profess 
the belief would be evidence of a derangement of reason. Likewise, the 
sentiment spontaneously and of necessity arises within us in other cases, as 
in our expectation that an “honest an opulent” acquaintance who enters our 
house will not steal from us, or the feeling of love toward benefactors and 
hatred toward those who harm us.23 This is not certitude, nor is it logical 
necessity; but on the Humean view, it salvages the only kind of necessity in 
matters of fact available to the consistent empiricist.  
Meillassoux is of course a good deal more radical. In place of the 
defunct principle of sufficient reason he proposes the “principle of 
unreason,” or the “principle of factiality”24; this is the “speculative absolute” 
and it consists in the capacity-to-be-otherwise-without-reason.25 It asserts, as 
Hume could not, the necessity of contingency, and it salvages the principle 
of non-contradiction (in the ontological rather than conceptual realm, that of 
entities rather than thought) with provocative formulae: from “the absolute 
necessity of everything’s non-necessity,”26 or from the restored absolute of 
“hyper-Chaos”27—which means that everything is capable of becoming 
other than it is—we learn that a contradictory entity is impossible, because it 
could not become other than it is. “Consequently, we know by the principle 
of unreason why non-contradiction is an absolute ontological truth: because 
it is necessary that what is be determined in such a way as to be capable of 
becoming and of being subsequently determined in some other way  . . . the 
ontological meaning of the principle of non-contradiction, far from 
designating any sort of fixed essence, is that of the necessity of contingency, or 
in other words, of the omnipotence of chaos.”28  
Though we contended that there was a degree of imprecision in 
Meillassoux’s treatment of Hume, this cannot be said to invalidate his 
rejection of Hume’s “skeptical solution.” Meillassoux’s appeals to reason (for 
example his anhypothetical deduction of the absolute), then aim for a 
demonstrative power which outstrips a mere “sentiment” of belief. As 
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Badiou insists in his introduction, Meillassoux’s argument provides a proof 
for his position.29 One could not then be content to say that Meillassoux 
subscribes inadvertently to what we called the salvaged, weak form of the 
principle of sufficient reason in Hume, just in light of statements such as: “It 
seems to us that it would be wiser to believe in reason, and thereby to purge 
reality of the hinter-world of causal necessity,”30 or “  . . . .we have every 
reason to follow  . . . what reason indicates.”31 These rather indicate his 
distance from Hume, because he insists it is a rational proof, and not a 
skeptical proof or a matter of persuasion by rhetoric. The Humean seems 
destined to give up his weak necessity that is accorded to non-volitional 
belief, and accept Meillassoux’s necessity of contingency, or his “principle of 
unreason.” And yet it is difficult to imagine the abstract and speculative 
arguments of the book appealing to the determinedly practically-minded 
Hume. Perhaps taste should not dictate to reason, but it invariably does: de 
gustibus non est disputandum. It is true, however, that one can imagine Hume 
rejecting Meillassoux’s position out of more than inclination.   
How would Hume answer Meillassoux’s assertion of a determinable 
necessity? A possible Humean response may be elaborated in three stages. 
We first address an apparent paradox in Meillassoux’s disqualification of all 
necessity except that of contingency. In this light, “contingency” is a 
property of entities or beings, and cannot be considered an entity itself. The 
phenomenon of contingency (contingency as it appears to us) is not the same 
as other phenomena, those things which “come to light” as entities. The 
possibility of considering contingency an entity is disqualified by the 
assertion of its necessity. The absolute is “a being whose severance (the 
original meaning of absolutus) and whose separateness from thought is such 
that it presents itself to us as non-relative to us, and hence as capable of 
existing whether we exist or not.”32 The speculative absolute must uncover 
an absolute (independent of human existence) necessity without any form of 
absolutely necessary entity—an “absolute without an absolute entity”;33 
were contingency conceivably an entity, then, it would violate this 
requirement. Meillassoux admits the “apparently paradoxical” nature of this 
formula. But let us pursue it further. What beings are may be a contingent 
matter (the form they take, or the laws to which they conform or appear to 
conform), but for Meillassoux, that they are is not. This follows from the 
“strong interpretation” of the principle of factiality, for which Meillassoux 
argues and which is intended to answer the question: “Why is there 
something rather than nothing?”34 Where the weak interpretation merely 
asserts that if something exists, then it must be contingent, which in no way 
entails that something exists, the strong interpretation asserts: “to say that 
contingency is necessary, is to say both that things must be contingent, and 
that there must be contingent things.”35 The solution is expressed in the 
formula: “it is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is 
necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. The 
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necessity of the contingency of the entity imposes the necessary existence of 
the entity.”36 
Thus, there is something—either a singular something or a plurality of 
things; and this is necessary. And yet this something or these things cannot 
be considered absolute; the only absolute necessity remains contingency.37 
And yet, if we establish that there must of necessity be an existing 
something, is this something, regardless of the form it takes, not governed 
by an absolute necessity? In other words, is the existing something not to be 
considered an entity? Every being (regardless of what it is) seems to derive 
its existence from the imposed necessity that there be something—every 
being, therefore, would appear to be in some sense necessary. Now here is 
the crux of the problem: if contingency means that any being can become 
anything else, can become wholly other without reason (this is the principle 
of unreason/factiality), then reason or logic supplies no warrant to rule out 
the possibility that any particular entity might, in becoming other than it is, 
become necessary—i.e., in its capacity-to-become-wholly-other, it might pass 
from contingency to necessity. It might, for no reason, at any moment 
become a necessary being. This is what Meillassoux rules out: he denies 
what he calls “real necessity” to any entity—that is, “[the] ontological 
register of necessity which states that such and such an entity (or 
determinate res) necessarily exists.”38 Real necessity, then, is denied to 
entities due to the absolute necessity of contingency—whatever entities may 
exist, they are not determinate. No necessity governed their being what they 
are, and nothing prevents them from becoming wholly other—except the 
becoming-other that would involve their becoming necessary. Meillassoux 
refers to this restriction as an auto-restriction by the absolute of itself. 
Meillassoux’s speculative absolute, hyper-Chaos39 carries with it a 
“principle of an auto-limitation or auto-normalization of the omnipotence of 
chaos.”40 The propositions which “harbor” this principle state:  
  . . . we know two things that the sceptic did not: first, that 
contingency is necessary, and hence eternal; second, that 
contingency alone is necessary. But from this absolute 
necessity of contingency alone we can infer an 
impossibility that is every bit as absolute – for there is in 
fact something that this primary atom of knowledge 
ensures us is absolutely impossible, even for all powerful 
chaos, and this something, which chaos will never be able 
to produce, is a necessary entity. Everything is possible, 
anything can happen – except something that is necessary, 
because it is the contingency of the entity that is necessary, 
not the entity. Here we have a decisive difference between 
the principle of unreason and correlational facticity, for we 
now know that a metaphysical statement can never be 
true. We could certainly envisage the emergence of an 
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entity which, as a matter of fact, would be indiscernible 
from a necessary entity, viz., an everlasting entity, which 
would go on existing, just like a necessary entity. Yet this 
entity would not be necessary, and [we could only say 
that] as a matter of fact, and up until now, it has never 
ceased to be.41 
A rational discourse about unreason, therefore, is a discourse “that aims to 
establish the constraints to which the entity must submit in order to exercise 
its capacity-not-to-be and its capacity-to-be-other.42 The question that arises 
is this: what of chaos, omnipotent chaos itself? Is it not itself to be considered 
an entity, and a necessary one—even if whatever entities it produces are 
contingent, and perhaps non-totalizable? The “entities” potentially 
described by mathematical statements might include “a law, a world or an 
object.”43 Elsewhere the rejected “real necessity” is called an “entity,” where 
Meillassoux reiterates its rejection by the invocation of Ockham’s razor.44 If 
these are entities, possible subjects of mathematical description, it seems 
there is nothing to disqualify chaos itself, omnipotent chaos (its auto-
limitation concerns what it produces, and chaos does not “produce” itself) 
from consideration as an entity. Chaos if so considered (indeed, as a 
“world”?) would, of course, constitute an absolute entity. That is the 
paradox: contingency demands no necessary entity, but there appear no 
grounds for rejecting chaos, as a potential subject of mathematical 
statements, as an entity.   
But let us grant the speculative realist an equation of chaos with 
contingency, or the idea that chaos is nothing more or less than the absolute 
necessity of contingency, and disqualify it from consideration as an entity. 
The querying of entities, what can and cannot be catalogued as such, leads 
us then to the question: What is a law? The modern philosophical project is 
often said to begin with Francis Bacon, who explicitly broke with the 
ancients both in terms of goal and methodology, and whose influence 
helped to lay the foundations for modern science (certainly that other great 
innovator, Kant, seemed to subscribe to this view). It was indeed as such an 
innovator that Kennington evaluated Bacon’s work.45 In precisely what way 
or in what terms, then, did Bacon himself conceive of a law of nature? 
Addressing this question in a letter, Kennington wrote: 
Contemporary philosophy/history of science always 
begins with the fact of some scientific achievement, always 
with what Copernicus [or Kepler], Galileo, or Newton 
offered in the way of a new theory or law  . . . [such] 
entrenched opinions that (a) modern science begins with 
the Copernican ‘revolution’; (b) Kepler was the first to 
discover a law of nature in the modern sense, for example, 
a mathematically formulated description of a ‘natural 
regularity’; and (c) Galileo was the first to discover a law 
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of nature in the modern sense, since he proved 
mathematically the mathematical law governing the 
uniform acceleration of all bodies in free fall, whereas 
Kepler’s law, while mathematical in form, is not proved 
mathematically (‘deductively’), and is of restricted scope  . 
. . In principle, however, there is no necessity for saying 
that it was impossible for Bacon to conceive the general 
notion of ‘law’ without ever having himself discovered a 
single law.46 
An example of Bacon’s idea of a law is the law of heat, which cuts across 
phenomena or natural kinds which exhibit heat. In an essay on Locke, 
Kennington described Bacon’s view: “Bacon observed that there are 
significant phenomena that cut across the kinds; they are kind-neutral, so to 
speak. For example, heat, light, and gravitation. Heat isn’t differentiated 
according to kind; the heat of a man, a rabbit, and a star is exactly the same 
phenomenon, and we must seek for the one underlying law of heat, which is 
the same everywhere in the universe, a law of which Aristotelians had never 
dreamed.”47 Bacon, of course, had he access to later scientific developments, 
would have conceded that the “law of heat” is not a law; laws for Bacon 
pertain to the minima of existing things, and so the so-called “law of heat” 
would have been superseded by the demonstration that the phenomenon of 
heat can be explained by the laws of motion, just as electricity and 
magnetism were unified in Maxwell’s equations.48 In principle, however, as 
Kennington maintains, there is nothing to suggest Bacon was incapable, in 
light of the state of contemporary scientific learning, of conceiving of a law 
of nature such as those proposed by Kepler or Galileo. Now, for brevity’s 
sake, we cannot repeat here the ten listed, and related, characteristics of a 
law of nature which Kennington identifies in Bacon—though we would 
certainly not discourage any reader from consultation of Kennington’s essay; 
we must then extract, hoping that we elide nothing essential to the analysis, 
a selection of the remarks most pertinent to the present essay. To begin: 
All laws are necessary, in the sense that they describe 
either (a) necessary processes of minima or (b) necessary 
relations between minima and qualities or (c) both. 
Probably Bacon wavers between (a), (b), and (c). But (c) is 
probably what he hoped to find, as is evident from New 
Organon 2.4. if the form, that is to say, the law, is present, 
the simple [nature] infallibly grows; if the form or law is 
absent, the nature ‘infallibly’ is absent. Here Bacon gives 
us at least one clear identification (in c) of what ‘necessity’ 
of a modern law of nature could mean  . . . 49 
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Further: “Law unifies horizontally the diverse manifestations thereof in 
different natural kinds by tracing to a single, common principle the same 
quality that is evident in them. New Organon 2.3: “whosoever is acquainted 
with forms embraces the unity of nature in substances [in materiis] the most 
unlike.””50 He continues: 
Since each law is necessary, and all are laws of minima, 
that is to say, matter without the ‘formal’ organization of 
wholes, every law stands in a relation of necessity to every 
other in principle, though this relation may not now or 
ever be known; or nature is a system of laws. Bacon states 
the necessary relation in the locus classicus in [New 
Organon] 2.4 on ‘form’ or law, where we take 
‘deducibility’ to mean ‘stand in a necessary relation to  . . . 
’ And the notion of ‘system of laws’ is contained in his 
notion of a summa lex or magna forma  . . . if we construe the 
summa lex or supreme law to be the unified system itself.51 
This horizontal unification is independent of any “vertical” unification, i.e., 
an individual law may be discovered and held demonstrably true without 
our knowing the full system of laws or how they related to one another: “A 
law therefore can be known as a law without a vertical unification of the 
whole of nature, which would result in the derivation (a) of each law from 
the summa lex and (b) in turn, of the summa lex from some original 
properties, or motions, of the ultimate material particles of all things  . . . “ 
Kennington adds: “If the derivation of the summa lex from the ultimate 
particles were available, then in that case at least, and only in that case in 
fact, some beings in the universe would have laws that pertain to them as 
such—in propria persona, as it were. Hence—since such ultimate particles are 
simples—no natural compounds (or “concrete” or “mixed” bodies) have 
laws that pertain to them as such.”52 
We see that inherent in the Baconian concept of law is a law’s necessity. 
A contingent law of nature would then be a contradiction in terms. On this 
view, in a person’s asserting that the laws of nature are not or at least cannot 
be confirmed as necessary, he would be saying: it is possible that what we 
perceive as laws of nature are not actually laws. We must of course separate 
concept from perception here: if our concept of a law (of nature) involves its 
necessity, then the possibility of its changing or its not holding in the future 
(hence revealing itself to future perception to be false) may be considered to 
reveal not that a law or all laws of nature are contingent, but that such-and-
such a law or laws we had formulated were not in fact laws of nature. The 
objection to Meillassoux (less so to Hume, as he does not assert contingency, 
only the non-verifiability of necessity, and asserts our continued belief in 
necessity as a result of custom) that this implies is neither sophistry nor even 
reducible to semantic quibbles. Is it possible, indeed, to regard a law of 
nature which is contingent as a law, or is necessity here essential to the very 
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concept of law? This is the second stage of our conjectured Humean 
response.   
Meillassoux’s position involves the conviction that “whatever is 
mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible,” and that “what is 
mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correlate of thought.”53 The 
mathematizable—not only pure but also applied mathematics, or 
mathematics applied to the totality of laws and phenomena we traditionally 
call “nature”—is thus absolute, and whatever is mathematically conceivable 
becomes “absolutely possible.” Now, to be possible, if it has any meaning, can 
only mean “to be possibly true”; and to be absolutely possible is to be 
possibly, and absolutely, true. The “absolute” nature of mathematical 
statements (e.g., those about laws), which allows for the non-correlational 
truth of what Meillassoux labels “dia-chronic” statements, or of “ancestral 
statements,” is expressed by Meillassoux in the proposition that: “the truth 
or falsity of a physical law is not established with regard to our own 
existence – whether we exist or do not exist has no bearing upon its truth.”54 
We should recognize the oddity of this formulation (another example, 
perhaps, of imprecision in Meillassoux’s language, as we saw in regard to 
Hume and the a priori): the notion of the falsity of a physical law is 
superfluous. There cannot be a false physical law; a law can only be true, or 
it is not a law. The notion of a false law could make sense only where there 
was a false or inadequate formulation of a law by human beings—which, 
say, had become enshrined in the canon of scientific knowledge but which 
was subsequently revised in light of scientific developments—which 
example would of course contradict the idea of a physical law’s 
absoluteness. It is from here we may begin to indicate two shortcomings of 
Meillassoux’s position in relation to those it claims to overcome or surpass: 
first, far from answering or refuting Hume, it remains itself 
(straightforwardly) open to a Humean brand of skepticism; and second, its 
attempted refutation of the skeptical hypothesis, and overcoming of 
correlationism, involves what we might call the “Kantian moment” in 
Meillassoux’s thought.      
To be possible, as we mentioned, means to be possibly true; but can to 
attain truth, in reference to a physical law or a law of nature, mean anything 
other than “to be necessary”? Certainly, as we said, no such notion as a false 
physical law can have content, without the notion compromising 
Meillassoux’s assertion of the physical law’s absoluteness. If we held to such 
a notion of law, denying necessity to laws of nature, there would be nothing 
to essentially separate human laws that are a product of legislative acts or 
the nomothetic function from laws of nature: both would be equally 
contingent, and any necessity would be merely empirical. With Meillassoux 
one cannot, of course, model the laws of nature after the model of laws of 
nomothetic origin, as these latter are anything but absolute; yet it seems 
difficult to definitely separate or distinguish the former while still denying 
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them real necessity. The dia-chronic or ancestral statement—that which 
concerns the state of the natural world without human witness—expresses 
the essence of modern science: examples of such statements are those 
concerning stellar emission or the decay of radioactive material. The only 
meaning these statements can have, for Meillassoux, is their literal meaning. 
As he puts it: “an ancestral statement only has sense if its literal sense is also its 
ultimate sense  . . . This is what we shall express in terms of the ancestral 
statement’s irremediable realism: either this statement has a realist sense, and 
only a realist sense, or it has no sense at all.”55 Or in terms of his examples: 
“both this [radioactive] decay and this [stellar] emission are conceived in 
such a way that they would have been identical to what we think about 
them even if human thought had never existed to think them.”56 This 
formulation again may give us pause: does not its outward form express or 
present exactly the kind of necessity ordinarily asserted about nature?—that, 
had we not been here, the course of nature would have been exactly the 
same; or that mathematical statements describing phenomena which 
occurred before (or are projected to occur after) the existence of human 
beings express objective, realist, non-correlational truths? The assertion of 
the omnipotence of chaos or the necessity of contingency would seem to 
contradict this formulation: how can one assert that any phenomena, 
including those of stellar emission or radioactive decay, would have been 
identical to how they are measured, without reintroducing a form of 
necessity? With chaos in mind, we would have to say: it would have been 
identical, had it followed the course it did, but it could have followed a very 
different course (as Meillassoux recognizes when he writes that science 
thinks a time in which life, and therewith “givenness,” might never have 
emerged).57 Perhaps we are only harping on imprecision of statements once 
more; but in the form of statements reside the nuances on which arguments 
turn.  
In the course of the discussion of the ancestral statement and its 
absolute or non-correlational nature, the earlier notion of the truth or falsity 
of a physical law gives way to that of the meaningful statement, or the 
ability to meaningfully formulate laws. There is a shift of focus to meaning, 
or meaningfulness, rather than truth—understandable, of course, given that 
Meillassoux freely admits any particular dia-chronic statement may be 
subject to correction or revision. That emission or decay would have been 
identical “is in any case a feasible hypothesis which science renders 
meaningful, and which expresses the latter’s general capacity to be able to 
formulate laws irrespective of the question of the existence of a knowing 
subject.”58 This is linked to the earlier recorded assertion that whatever is 
mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible. This “absoluteness,” says 
Meillassoux, expresses the idea that “it is meaningful to think (even if only 
in a hypothetical register) that all those aspects of the given that are 
mathematically describable can continue to exist regardless of whether or 
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not we are there to convert the latter into something that is given-to or 
manifested-for.”59 In sum: 
  . . . the meaning of the dia-chronic statement about 
radioactive decay older than all terrestrial life is only 
conceivable if it is construed as absolutely indifferent to 
the thought that envisages it. Accordingly, the 
absoluteness of that which is mathematizable means: the 
possibility of factial existence outside thought – and not: 
the necessity of existence outside thought. Whatever is 
mathematizable can be posited hypothetically as an 
ontologically perishable fact existing independently of us  
. . . what is mathematizable cannot be reduced to a 
correlation of thought.60 
The problem here is that, contra Meillassoux, recourse to the 
mathematizable does not banish the skeptical challenge. At the level of 
simple mathematics, taken as a paradigm of rule-following behavior, this 
was of course the essence of the “skeptical paradox” famously elaborated by 
“Kripke’s Wittgenstein.” The matter is far too well-worn for us to rehearse in 
any detail, but its thesis in brief is the following: say I perform the equation 
68 + 57, obtaining the answer “125.” A skeptic, however, claims that in the 
past the symbol “+” and the word “plus” in fact designated a function called 
“quus,” a function defined by: x quus y = x + y, if x, y, < 57; otherwise, “x 
quus y” = 5.61 The skeptical challenge can be generalized for any function or 
equation. It represents, for Kripke, a skeptical challenge as grave as was 
Hume’s—indeed he suggests the skeptical paradox he claims Wittgenstein 
to outline represents “the most radical and original skeptical problem that 
philosophy has seen to date.”62 Kripke follows the Humean model in 
suggesting that Wittgenstein can furnish only a skeptical solution, 
essentially a view of rule-following that makes it an intersubjective activity, 
subject to validation or correction by a community of participants in a 
“language-game,” and a view of meaning that makes it fundamentally 
community-dependent.63 This restores, of course, an element of human 
decision to mathematical functions, because the rules governing their 
application can be formulated in more ways than one—indeed, in utterly 
absurd but nevertheless meaningful ways.  
There is no reason why advanced mathematical calculation, which is 
itself a system of far more complex rules, should not be subject to the same 
skeptical challenge. Thus, “what is mathematizable” is no criterion for 
defining the absolute: there is no reason why one could not mathematize 
even the most outrageous skeptical hypothesis and thereby render it 
meaningful (and it is the mathematizable nature of ancestral statements 
which allows Meillassoux to claim them to describe a reality not simply 
ancient but wholly anterior to givenness). From this perspective, the 
speculative position advanced by Meillassoux remains powerless, despite 
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the stress laid upon and central place in it of the dia-chronic statement, to 
refute a position such as Gosse’s hypothesis. There is nothing to prevent one 
mathematizing Gosse’s “omphalos” hypothesis, rendering meaningful the 
idea that the world was created by God along with fossil records and all 
other evidence of “ancestral” events, such as stellar emissions and 
radioactive decay.64 To mathematically render this hypothesis does not of 
course render it persuasive, but it renders it meaningful: this is more 
especially the case where omnipotent chaos has been accepted as a fact.65 At 
such a point, one must weigh one interpretation against the other; the 
assertion of contingency may survive such a move, but that of absoluteness 
cannot.66  
The mathematization of nature ensures, for Meillassoux, the 
incorporation of ancestral statements into the realm of knowledge. Thus the 
dia-chronic statement expresses the essence of empirical science. What this 
expression does not do is disqualify the idea of another, non-human 
correlation.  
Such statements certainly do not claim that there could be 
no relation to the world other than the human relation to 
the world – we cannot prove that dia-chronic events could 
not have been the correlates of a non-human relation to 
the occurrence (i.e. we cannot prove that they were not 
witnessed by a god or by a living creature). But science’s 
dia-chronic statements assume that the ‘question of the 
witness’ has become irrelevant to knowledge of the 
event.67  
We have been presented here with the question of knowledge of the 
event; or, we have found our way back from the question of meaningfulness 
to that of truth (it is just subsequent to this passage that the shift in 
Meillassoux’s discussion occurs).68 In terms of the skeptical challenge we 
have been discussing, then, this passage strikes us as an evasion. That a dia-
chronic event may have been witnessed by a non-human entity or 
intelligence may not affect our knowledge of it; but if it was caused by a non-
human intelligence—Gosse’s God, for example—or if a non-human 
intelligence arranged things such that it appears to us that such an event had 
occurred, when in fact it had not, this certainly affects what counts as our 
knowledge of it. If Gosse’s hypothesis or Russell’s extension were true, not 
only could we not disprove it, but we could not rule out the possibility of 
science’s discovering its truth at a future date; thus, what now counted as 
scientific knowledge would be subject to such radical revision as not to 
count as knowledge at all, or at least to be rendered inadequate and even 
illusory. This is because this would not only affect the questions on which 
science has always run and still avowedly runs aground, those of final 
causes, of telē; it would pertain not only to the why, but to the how. As 
mentioned, Bacon, Descartes and Newton all asserted the scientific-
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experimental primacy of method, avoiding metaphysical or philosophical 
questions, and this remains the required procedure in contemporary 
science.69 The issue of Gosse’s or similar hypotheses, however, addresses not 
only the origin and destiny (or purpose, if any) of the universe, but its order 
and its organization. This problem, this skeptical challenge, seems to us 
conjured away only by the typical Humean skeptical solution: the question 
of which of any two explanations is more believable, whether indeed it is 
possible for a sane man to believe in an unlikely tale supported by some 
madcap mathematics, and how trust and custom remain the great guides of 
human life. Of course, this ties what counts as knowledge to human 
presence and judgment, and discounts the absoluteness of the ancestral 
statement. To express a preference reintroduces the human element; one 
cannot even invoke Ockham’s razor, or recur to Laplace’s famous “Sire, je 
n’ai pas eu besoin de cette hypothèse” without compromising the absoluteness 
of the scientific statement, ancestral or otherwise.70 Again, merely accepting 
or asserting the irremediable realism of these “ancestral” statements cannot 
refute Gosse’s hypothesis—Meillassoux’s position is still vulnerable to a 
Humean skepticism. With regard to ancestral statements, a variety of 
interpretations are still mathematically conceivable (and so absolutely 
possible), based on the skeptical challenge to the concept or phenomenon of 
rule-following. This holds, it seems, unless we accept the notion of an order 
in nature which is not only stable but necessary, and the successful 
formulation or interpretation or decipherment of which furnishes absolute 
scientific knowledge. It seems to us, then, that Meillassoux’s concentration 
on Kantian correlationism as the bête noir of speculative materialism has 
occluded the radicality of Hume’s original challenge, to which Kant 
responded.  
We finally reach the third stage of the Humean objection. Russell’s 
extension or radicalization of Gosse’s hypothesis reminds one of Hume’s 
assertion that the “self” was nothing more than a “bundle of perceptions.”71 
Indeed, Russell had in mind at the time of speaking (about the phenomenon 
of memory) Hume’s principle from the Enquiry that ideas were copies or 
approximations of impressions. The skeptical position must of course query 
the stability or necessity of the interior self, as well as that of the observable 
regularities in the external world. Meillassoux admits that a fully worked-
out theory which accepts contingency or the omnipotence of chaos—or a 
speculative resolution of Hume’s problem—should ideally account for or 
provide precise conditions for the observed stability of physical laws.72 
Hume shifted the question to accounting for our belief in that stability—
indeed, in the laws’ necessity, or in the existence of a necessary connection 
between events. This skeptical solution, in which consists what we called 
Hume’s correlationism, is rejected by Meillassoux. He goes considerably 
further than Hume, as we have seen, in asserting contingency, intuited a 
priori by reason, where Hume (and like him Bacon and Descartes) had 
restricted himself to asserting non-provable necessity (and that, as we have 
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argued, not strictly deduced a priori). Meillassoux’s position may be restated 
here as he presented it in a more recent work, which shows the boldness and 
explicitness with which it is both held and expressed:   
Now, our perspective is the inverse of Hume’s: for we 
propose  . . . to start out from the effective possibility that 
natural laws might break down without reason, in favour 
of an eventuality incompatible with them. For we pose the 
following question: since Hume has convinced us that we 
could a priori (that is to say without contradiction) 
conceive a chaotic modification of natural laws, why not 
have confidence in the power of thought, which invites us 
to posit the contingency of the laws of nature, rather than in 
experience, in which alone the presentation of the 
apparent fixity of observable constants finds its source? 
Why extrapolate the empirical fixity of laws into a belief in 
their necessity, rather than adhering to the intellection of a 
radical Chaos which Hume has masterfully, if implicitly, 
revealed to us? Why not, in other words, absolutise the 
failure of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, by 
maintaining that the meaning of that absence of reason for 
laws which we run up against in the Humean problem is 
not an incapacity of thought to discover such reasons, but 
a capacity of thought to intuit a priori, in the real itself, the 
effective absence of the reason of things as laws, and the 
possibility of their being modified at any moment?73 
What is wrong here, it seems, is that Meillassoux has failed to grasp the full 
implications of his position: he has failed, in other words, to account for or to 
address that other aspect of the properly skeptical position, the querying of 
the internal consistency of the self or, what amounts to the same, of 
observing or deducing reason. The problem is twofold. On the one hand, if 
nature or the laws of nature can change at any moment, without warning 
and without reason, and reason cannot account for their apparent stability, 
then these laws can only ever be “as they appear to us,” temporarily and in 
passing. To clarify: we cannot in fact assert their stability, because we cannot 
assert the truth of memory or past experiences. The other side of the 
problem is what Meillassoux has assumed: the passage above assumes, quite 
illegitimately, the stability of reason’s rules or observations, a position which 
is inconsistent—incoherent, even—given that adopted vis-à-vis the laws of 
nature. Meillassoux implicitly and without comment exempts human reason 
from the contingent physical laws or the chaos which makes up the external 
world. Even if one hesitates, on good philosophical grounds, to accept a 
crude or hasty physicalist reduction of mental to biochemical events—which 
would deny the freedom of the will, and insert mankind firmly into the 
chain of natural causality—Meillassoux’s move here is out of step with his 
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assertion of contingency. One might call this Meillassoux’s “Kantian 
moment.” His position essentially adopts two aspects of Kantian 
correlationism: it supposes a unity and potency of observing reason such 
that one can deduce using reason alone such things as the contingency of 
physical laws (for Kant this unity is the transcendental unity of apperception 
and the unity of nature derived from the categories); and it supposes, 
silently, a human subject (which for Kant would be the noumenal subject) 
effectively exempted from the chain of natural causality or chaos.74 If human 
beings are subject to the physical laws of nature (and as Feynman is fond of 
reminding, physics explains, via quantum electrodynamics, all of chemistry, 
and so in turn all of biology), there is nothing to prevent a Gregor Samsa 
waking up one morning transformed into a giant crawling creature, or one’s 
genetic makeup suddenly changing for no reason whatsoever. This, of 
course, may be admitted by Meillassoux; more damaging to his position is 
that it has imported a putative unity and continuity of observing reason 
without further ado, which it seems could be justified only through a 
Kantian argument that the unity of the self is based on the stability in nature, 
which is itself necessary because derived from the self. Certainly one 
element of Hume’s challenge which Kant sought to meet was that it 
potentially undermined the human being’s claim to intellectual and moral 
autonomy, to the degree that one was rendered incapable of authentic moral 
action.75 All of this has been sidestepped in Meillassoux’s passage, which 
implicitly assumes the legitimacy of a priori rational deductions. Opposing 
this is the final riposte of the skeptic: for how can one arrogate such power 
to reason, given the assertion of contingency? Again, on this point, the 
skeptic appears unanswered. We return then to Humean correlationism: the 
speculative solution to Hume’s problem does not surpass the original 
skeptical solution. As we cautioned at the very outset (and as is 
acknowledged in the last, lengthy passage from Meillassoux cited above), 
the assertion of contingency, or that “anything might happen” is 
unwarranted in Meillassoux: the traditional skepticism which asserts the 
non-provability of necessity and the inaccessibility of final causes, and 
which was shared in one form or another by Bacon, Descartes, Hume and 
Newton, remains all that can be legitimately asserted.76 Our positive 
knowledge does not advance beyond the skeptic’s; and neither skepticism 
nor by extension correlationism stands refuted by the speculative turn.  
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1
 Hume, Enquiry §§ 24, 26–7, 44; cf. Nietzsche, Der Wille Zur Macht § 550. For 
Hume, the reason behind the world and its processes was obscure. For Descartes in 
the Meditations, the problem, which amounts to the same thing, was that the 
purposes of the creator remained definitively beyond our ken, and here the class of 
final causes ran aground (Meditations IV.6).  Cf. F. Bacon, New Organon I.48, on the 
“unquiet” human understanding, which does not rest with what it rightly within its 
remit: “ . . . this inability [of the understanding to stop] interferes more 
mischievously in the discovery of causes; for although the most general principles in 
nature ought to be held merely positive, as they are discovered, and cannot in truth 
be referred to a cause, nevertheless the human understanding being unable to rest 
still seeks something prior in the order of nature”; and cf. Hume, Enquiry §§ 6–8 on 
the need for speculation to restrict itself to “the proper province of human reason.” 
Compare further Richard Kennington’s comments on the attitude of Descartes which 
reveals itself in the course of the Discourse on Method: “But can the truth about the 
first principles of all things, of the whole, be essentially simple? There is another 
possibility, namely, that the truth which the philosophers sought, the truth of 
ultimate principles, is either unavailable or is unnecessary or both. The first 
principles may be replaced by methodology  . . . The phrase “laws of nature” seems 
to imply a divine lawgiver but none is in fact necessary  . . . The simulation of the 
divine lawgiver serves to dissimulate the absence of any metaphysical first 
principles. The laws of nature are known as laws because they satisfy the 
requirements of method, not because they can be traced to or lead to some 
metaphysical principle. In short, methodology and metaphysics are mutually 
exclusive  . . . This is the modern concept of nature. Descartes does not know the 
ultimate parts. Newton insisted, “I don’t know the ultimate parts; I don’t need to 
for the sake of my three fundamental laws of motion.” No one today knows the 
ultimate parts either.” R. Kennington, “Descartes’s Discourse on Method” in On 
Modern Origins: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy, eds. P. Kraus and F. Hunt (New 
York: Lexington Books), 110, 120. We may note that Descartes’s assertion that the 
will of God is beyond temporal, human understanding, which disqualifies in advance 
the search for final causes, can well be regarded not as a measure of his piety, but 
of his prudence. It invokes a religious reason for the abandonment of metaphysics 
(which, we may recall, Aristotle made synonymous not only with “first philosophy” 
but also with “theology”) in favor of method, or for the abandonment of the search 
for first principles in the sciences: the goals of reason are thus instrumental and 
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methodical, rather than contemplative. In a letter to his old mentor Marin 
Mersenne, Descartes had indeed informed him, while asking him not to relay the 
fact, that: “these six Meditations contain the whole foundation of my physics”; he 
hoped his readers would perceive the truth of his principles “before perceiving that 
they destroy those of Aristotle.” Quoted in Kennington, “The “Teaching of Nature” 
in Descartes’s Soul Doctrine,” 164. 
2
 Hume calls this portion of his argument the “positive solution.” Though he intends 
the word, of course, as merely subsequent and superior to his “negative” answer, it 
is also one which yields a conception of the principles of nature which is “positive” 
in Bacon’s sense in the note above—that is, which concedes the unavailability of 
first principles or final causes.   
3
 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. R. Brassier (Continuum, 2011), 88. Hume, Enquiry §§ 36, 39–41 cf. §§ 59–61.    
4
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B163. 
5
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 90. 
6
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 91. 
7
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 30–32. Rejection of the ontological argument could 
alternatively be based on the rejection of the principle that existence is superior to 
inexistence (Solon, or Silenus, answers Scholasticism). Otherwise a being which 
encompassed within itself every possible perfection would imply as part of its 
perfection its existence. From the formula of Anselm, God as the being “greater 
than which cannot be thought,” one would contend: to maintain that a being which 
is the sum of all perfections may exist or not exist is a contradiction. If we conceive 
of two of such beings, one existing and one not existing, or one whose existence is 
necessary while the other’s is unnecessary, the former is a more perfect being. This 
would be invalid if existence were not a perfection, or not inherently superior to 
inexistence. 
8
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 91. 
9
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B xii–xiii (note the reference to Bacon); Descartes, 
Meditations II.9–10, III.4; the implied critique of Cartesianism in Vico’s New Science, 
which makes mathematics and geometry human inventions, and which reproves 
philosophical investigation of nature, known only to God (or the search for final 
causes), seems to miss the partial Cartesian commitment to both positions. New 
Science I.iii.331–2; I.iv.342, 349. Vico sees his view as remaining in accord with the 
Baconian method of philosophizing, I.iv.359. Compare too Hegel’s differentiation of 
the ancient from the modern approach in asserting that the ancients began with 
 
1 5 4  |  H u m e ’ s  C o r r e l a t i o n i s m  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.564 
 
beings or experience, and derived concepts from observation, where the moderns 
begin with the concept. The Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, § 33; cf. J. Klein, 
Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, trans. E. Brann (New York: 
Dover, 1992), 120–21. 
10
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 87. 
11
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 95. 
12
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 97. 
13
 E.g. Hume, Enquiry, §§ 13–18, 49–50.   
14
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 90 –91. 
15
 Note Hume’s assertion in § 30 that he can conceive of fabulous things—a falling 
body which looks like snow but is hot and tastes salty—”clearly and distinctly.” The 
echo of the Cartesian criterion of truth in the Meditations—that one’s perceptions 
be known “claire et distincte”—seems obvious, and intended to distinguish his 
position from that of Descartes.  
16
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 95–99. 
17
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 100. 
18
 Cf. ibid., 119 on Kant’s correlationism: “  . . . it construes those elements that 
seem to be indifferent to our relation to the world in terms of that relation itself.” 
19
 Hume, Enquiry, § 39. 
20
 Hume, Enquiry, § 35. Bacon, Essays, 39, “Of Custom and Education”: “Many 
examples may be put of the force of custom, both upon mind and body. Therefore, 
since custom is the principal magistrate of man's life, let men by all means 
endeavour, to obtain good customs." 
21
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 124, cf. 88. 
22 Taking up the language of the later distinction made by Sellars, we might say that 
the principle operates in the “space of reasons,” if not in the “space of causes.” 
23
 Hume, Enquiry, §§ 70, 38. 
24
 Meillassoux in fact seems to use “factiality” (factualité) once (AF, 73) before it is 
properly introduced as a term and defined (ibid., 79). It is rendered “factuality,” 
but the context, which implies synonymy with the principle of unreason, seems to 
require “factiality.”  
25
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 56; cf. 60. 
26
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 62. 
27
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64. 
28
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 71.  
29
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, vii. 
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30
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 91. 
31
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 107. 
32
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 28. 
33
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 34. 
34
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 71. 
35
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 73. 
36
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 76. 
37
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 80. 
38
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 32. 
39
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64. 
40
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 66. 
41
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 65–66.  
42
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 66. 
43
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 127. 
44
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 107. 
45
 It is popular to trace this break not to Bacon but to the innovations of 
Machiavelli; thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and Leo Strauss agree on this point, 
though they characterize the break differently. As regards the latter, Kennington—
who rented a room in Strauss’s apartment in Chicago—certainly felt no influence as 
strongly as that of Strauss in the formation of his philosophical outlook, and he 
acknowledges Bacon’s awareness of the potentialities opened up by Machiavelli’s 
work in his essay “Bacon’s Humanitarian Revision of Machiavelli,” in On Modern 
Origins, 57–77. In terms of a strictly (one might even say more narrowly) 
philosophical break with the ancients, however, rather than a general one, and one 
that is theoretical and metaphysical in a way Machiavelli’s political philosophy is 
not, Bacon may be said to stand at the fount of the modern philosophical or 
scientific tradition.  
46
 Kennington, “Appendix: Laws of Nature,” 52. This is a tradition which Meillassoux 
follows, even if he cautions that the “Galileism” he places at the beginning of 
modern science is a shorthand for “the mathematization of nature,” rather than a 
reference to the systematic ideas of Galileo, as these “continued to be suffused 
with Platonism and did not by themselves represent a complete break with the 
conception of the cosmos held by the Ancients” (After Finitude, 136 n. 1). His 
source or authority for such a claim is in part the work of Alexandre Koyré. It 
resembles Koyré’s claim that Kepler remained in crucial respects “bound by 
tradition” such that he could still be considered an Aristotelian. Koyré, From the 
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Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 72, 
87. This is however something Kennington would contest. Imagining Aristotle 
confronted with the “entrenched opinions” mentioned, he contends: “Aristotle 
would have dismissed such opinions, since [Copernican astronomy] is not a physics or 
is only concerned with celestial phenomena; and neither Kepler nor Galileo seeks to 
offer either a complete physics, or a method that would lead to a complete physics, 
or attempted to offer (as Bacon did) that reflection on the central notion of “law” 
which is at least a complete approach to a complete physics.”  
47
 Kennington, “Nature and Natural Right in Locke,” in On Modern Origins, 257. 
Kennington often recurs to this example in his writings on Bacon. See On Modern 
Origins, 25–6, 28, 37, 42, 45, 53–4 
48
 This principle creates its own difficulties, of course, pertaining to levels of 
description and whether one can be “deeper” and hence more fundamental than 
another, even where the other retains restricted validity. The theory of quantum 
electrodynamics as formulated by Feynman, Schwinger and others in the twentieth 
century, for example, does not entirely invalidate, even if it supersedes, say, 
Maxwell’s equations, which remain adequate and applicable in certain contexts and 
therefore, within those contexts, true. Furthermore, the so-called “correspondence 
principle” in physics reminds us that the new physics of the twentieth century did 
not simply displace or make redundant, by invalidation, the entirety of the classical 
model. How these matters might affect our conception of a law of nature is a 
question outside of our present concerns. We may note further that Meillassoux 
names heat, along with flavor and smell, among examples of a body’s sensible 
qualities (After Finitude, 115; cf. 11–12). 
49
 Kennington, “Appendix: Laws of Nature,” 53. 
50




 Kennington, “Appendix: Laws of Nature,” 54–5. These assertions of necessity are 
complicated by what we might call Bacon’s skepticism, which is of precisely the 
same kind as that of Hume and Descartes, regarding final causes: “  . . . we recall 
that when Bacon said that the laws of nature are eternal and immutable, he added, 
“in the eye of reason, at least” (New Organon 2.9). What restrains Bacon from 
saying that the laws of nature are unchangeable simply is just his sober appreciation 
of the requirements of theoretical knowledge. Truly to know a law is to know its 
relation to other and more fundamental laws, or to the whole. Again, he has 
recorded his view that the true particles are changeable. It is unlikely that if the 
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true particles are changeable, the laws that regulate or describe their behavior are 
unchangeable. Of course the processes of change might have the structure of a 
repetition; Bacon suggests in one place that there is an eternal return of the stages 
of matter, and that it might be knowable by experimentation.” Kennington, 
“Bacon’s Ontology,” in On Modern Origins, 47. What is curious about Bacon’s 
addition here quoted is that for Meillassoux, as for Hume before him, it is precisely 
to the “eye of reason” that the laws of nature are not (demonstrably) eternal and 
immutable. For Meillassoux, in fact, reason should dictate that we not only deny 
that we have access to necessity, but that we  deny necessity—or that we have, via 
the operation of reason, access to the fact and reality of contingency.  
53
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 117. 
54
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 114. 
55
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 17. 
56
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 116–17.  
57
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 22. 
58






 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University 
Press, 1982), 7–9. The controversies the book has engendered among analytic 
philosophers concerning not only its interpretation of Wittgenstein but also its 
treatment of rule-following need not prevent us marshalling its thesis as an 
objection to give pause the speculative materialist in his assertion of the 
mathematization of nature providing us with absolute statements.    
62
 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 60. 
63
 E.g., Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 90–95.  
64
 As is well known, Russell extended this skeptical argument to the unfalsifiable 
proposition that the world began five minutes ago, with not only external evidence 
of greater age, but the past memories of all existing people (or one existing person) 
created simultaneously. While the idea strikes us as absurd, the extension does not 
even possess the refutational or confutational power of a logical RAA. B. Russell, 
The Analysis of Mind (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), 159–60. 
65
 Meillassoux asserts that the correlationist must find herself “dangerously close to 
contemporary creationists” (After Finitude, 18). It is true, perhaps, that a Humean 
skeptic could not refute outright the creationist claim that the world is 6,000 years 
old. One suspects, however, that Humean skepticism, which in philosophical terms, 
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speaks softly and carries a big stick, would be as unperturbed by this as it is by the 
prospect that human knowledge would be without definite or demonstrable 
foundation. And of course, it would point out that the creationist’s claim was 
subject to skeptical challenge even more than are scientific claims.  
66 As Meillassoux acknowledges, it did not require the advent of modern science for 
the concept of what he calls an ancestral statement to arise: countless myths and 
theogonies had expressed what had preceded or what would succeed mankind. What 
separates the modern scientific ancestral statement from these is its rootedness in 
the mathematization of nature, which meant that its assertions “were no longer of 
the order of myths, theogonies or fabulations, and instead became hypotheses 
susceptible to corroboration or refutation by actual experiments” (AF, 114). The 
idea that one can mathematically render a skeptical hypothesis—which would, in 
practical terms, no doubt stand refuted—reminds one of the persistence of the 
skeptical, fundamentally Humean, challenge. Meillassoux, for his part, does not 
definitively refute it—nor, importantly, can speculative materialism in fact refute 
the challenge of the creationist. Every scientific statement is conceivably 
“ancestral” as it takes account of a state of affairs resulting from and relating to 
the origin of the universe. As long as it cannot say why it is so, however, and not 
only how, it is susceptible on a theoretical level to the skeptical challenges of 
Hume, Russell or the creationist.  
67
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 116. 
68
 This is the problem with discussing the meaningfulness of scientific statements, 
or addressing the conditions under which they could be meaningful (cf. AF, 3, 9, 
10). Where Meillassoux asserts the realist meaning as the only meaning of these 
statements, the problem is not solved: these statements retain meaning even where 
they cannot be proved true.  
69
 As it was put very simply by perhaps the greatest twentieth century physicist: 
“The next reason you might think you do not understand what I am telling you is, 
while I am describing to you how Nature works, you don’t understand why Nature 
works that way. But you see, nobody understands that  . . . So again, we are not 
going to deal with why Nature behaves in the peculiar way She does; there are no 
good theories to explain that.” R. Feynman QED: The Strange Theory of Light and 
Matter (London: Penguin, 1990), 10, 12. Elsewhere: “The most shocking 
characteristic of the theory of quantum electrodynamics is the crazy framework of 
amplitudes, which you might think indicates problems of some sort! However, 
physicists have been fiddling around with amplitudes for more than fifty years now, 
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and we have gotten very used to it  . . . So this framework of amplitudes has no 
experimental doubt about it: you can have all the philosophical worries you want as 
to what the amplitudes mean (if, indeed, they mean anything at all), but because 
physics is an experimental science and the framework agrees with experiment, it’s 
good enough for us so far” (124). 
70
 On Laplace, see Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, 276. 
71
 Hume, Treatise, I.iv.6. 
72
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 101, 127; cf. 84–5. 
73
 Quentin Meillassoux, “Spectral Dilemma” in Collapse IV, Ed. R. Mackay 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2008), 273. 
74
 Assertion of the “omnipotence of chaos” (itself a problematic phrase, because 
potency tends to imply agency—i.e., it should be separated from potential; potency 
is based on actualized potential, what has and not what will or may come to be in 
the entity) should prompt caution. Meillassoux’s denial of necessity, and assertion of 
the omnipotence of chaos, ought to imply that there can only be logical, or even 
tautological, necessity. For example, one can assert: If a person believes x, that 
person believes x. But one can never, given the absoluteness or omnipotence of 
chaos, or the necessity of contingency, demonstrate that any person P at time t 
actually believes or believed x.  
75
 We should recall that Kant’s avowed motivation in the first Critique was in some 
way to salvage a priori knowledge from the skeptical challenge, and to provide a 
firmer foundation for human knowledge; to anyone who is not perturbed by the 
notion of knowledge without absolute foundation (and Gödel has perhaps taught us 
that logic dictates we not be so perturbed), the need for such a project as is 
undertaken by Kant is not self-evident. This is partly to say that the project had 
already a moral tincture from the outset. It is partly from this quite transparent 
fact, no doubt, that so many critics have historically concluded that the whole of 
the first Critique is only a prelude or preliminary to the second, and that Kant’s 
chief purpose was from the beginning to provide an intellectual basis for belief in 
the freedom of the will and the reality of morality—or to prove that what was 
already assumed in everyday human interaction was legitimately assumed. As 
Nietzsche so memorably put it, Kant wished to prove to “the whole world,” in a way 
that would utterly confound it, that “the whole world” was in the right (Die 
Fröhliche Wissenschaft, § 193). 
76
 The asserted contingency of the laws of nature (and the necessity of that 
contingency) Meillassoux claims to derive from reason alone. In Hume, however, 
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such a derivation would be disqualified from that class of things—to which, for 
example, geometrical proofs and other objects of “demonstrative reasoning” 
belong—which are known “by the mere operation of reason.” To know something in 
this way—or to truly know it a priori—would in the case of, e.g., an unfamiliar 
object, require us to discern its effects or its cause in its very being, immediately 
and without either experience of it or drawing analogy with prior experience. To 
actually know, by the mere operation of reason, that physical laws (which are 
themselves “entities”) were contingent, would require reason to discern not merely 
that they are or may be so, but precisely why they are and must be so: without 
knowledge of final cause, the asserted contingency is impossible. Cf. Hume, Enquiry 
§§ 23–4, 35. A consciousness capable of such reasoning would perhaps “violate the 
essential finitude of the transcendental subject” (AF, 42) by virtue of its immediate 
access to reality via reason. The question of morality again raises its head in this 
respect. Descartes had contended that his will had a scope as great as God’s, but 
that, not being omniscient or omnipotent, he lacked the power to always act on his 
will, or to always will the best for himself and avoid error. Had he these attributes, 
he says, he would always know immediately what was right and wrong, and would 
never be led either into error or sin (Meditations IV.8–9). Kant, in perhaps his most 
famous imagining of a consciousness with immediate access to things-in-themselves, 
evokes the idea to assert that this access would deprive us of the conditions for 
properly moral action, and in fact would render us “puppets” (Critique of Practical 
Reason, section IX, “On the Wise Adaptation of Man’s Cognitive Faculties to his 
Practical Vocation”). 
